DK2-55 Ateos famosos: Daniel Dennett, 2a. parte

Understanding Daniel Dennett's Model of Atheism

Introduction to Daniel Dennett

• The program introduces Daniel Dennett, a prominent American philosopher and cognitive scientist known for his views on atheism and consciousness.

• The discussion focuses on how Dennett connects neurological research with the understanding of the human mind.

Consciousness Explained

• Dennett's influential work, "Consciousness Explained" (1991), aims to clarify what consciousness is, emphasizing it as a scientific inquiry rather than a moral one.

• He argues that consciousness can be explained through observable scientific phenomena, advocating for a third-person observational approach.

Critique of Dennett's Theory

• The program references an article by Mariah Rus Tudela and Juanjo Acero that critiques Dennett’s theory of multiple drafts regarding consciousness.

• The critique suggests that Dennett fails to adequately explain consciousness and subjectivity, undermining the materialist foundation of his atheism.

Adaptiveness of Consciousness

• Critics argue that if Dennett's model were accurate, then consciousness would not serve an adaptive function in the brain.

• They assert that various neurological processes cannot lead to conscious control over behavior, which is essential for survival.

Hierarchical Processing in Consciousness

• The authors propose that information processing in the brain is hierarchical; only complexly organized information reaches conscious awareness.

• They emphasize that most neural representations do not have explicit control over behavior due to insufficient complexity.

Neurological Structures and Consciousness

• The critique posits that specific brain structures are responsible for representing highly processed information necessary for conscious experience.

• It highlights the need for a structured hierarchy in processing sensory data before it can become conscious awareness.

The Connection Between Mind and Body: Insights from René Descartes

The Pineal Gland and Consciousness

• The discussion begins with a reference to René Descartes' theory of the pineal gland as a connection between mind and body, although this theory is no longer supported today.

• Authors assert that there are indeed brain processes corresponding to what we define as consciousness, challenging the notion that consciousness merely provides functionality to representations.

Information Processing in Consciousness

• It is emphasized that we are only conscious of information that has been sufficiently processed, leading to a stable interpretation of reality.

• The concept of "phenomenological color" is introduced; our perception corrects variations in wavelength across an object (e.g., a piece of paper), assigning it a single color for adaptive purposes.

Cognitive Integration and Perception

• The brain integrates various wavelengths into a cohesive perception, which contrasts with Benet's assertion about the variability in conscious access to different types of information.

• If the theory proposed by Benet were accurate, our perception would fluctuate between basic analyses and more complex compositions, leading to inconsistent color perceptions.

Global Workspace Theory

• A global workspace model is discussed where specialized modules integrate sensory information; this integration allows for coherent perception despite varying inputs.

• This global workspace is not merely theoretical but corresponds to specific physical substrates within the brain, countering theories that aim to diminish the role of consciousness.

Implications on Subjectivity and Materialism

• The conversation raises questions about how this global workspace relates to subjectivity and our understanding of material existence through perception.