Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West?

Introduction

The speaker introduces the event and the topic of discussion.

• The event is a live stream and will be recorded.

• The speaker welcomes everyone to Chatham House.

• The speaker introduces the author, Kier Giles, who has written a book called "Moscow Rules".

• The book is about how Russia works and Western approaches to Russia in the post-Cold War period.

Speaker's Background

The speaker provides an introduction to Kier Giles' professional background.

• Kier Giles has experience as a translator, stand-up comedian, pilot, actor, interpreter librarian twice, radio journalist, National Small Business Award winner, editor web designer, security guard and radio presenter.

• He specializes in Russian side by an information warfare which is of course everything that we want to know about.

• His experience includes being associated with Chatham House and Russian Eurasia program.

Importance of Anatomy Teaching

The speaker highlights the importance of anatomy teaching for understanding the complexity of Russia today.

• Kier Giles' experience as an anatomy teacher is essential for dissecting the complexity of Russia today.

• This experience is also represented in his book "Moscow Rules".

Q&A Session

The speaker informs attendees that there will be a Q&A session after Kier Giles' talk.

• Attendees are encouraged to prepare their questions.

• There will be at least half an hour for questions.

• Attendees are asked to introduce themselves and state their affiliation when asking a question.

Introduction to "Moscow Rules"

Kier Giles introduces his book "Moscow Rules" and explains why he wrote it.

• Kier Giles wrote "Moscow Rules" because of a feeling of deja vu when repeatedly asked what to do about Russia in policy seminars.

• Western approaches to Russia in the post-Cold War period have been repeating the same action while hoping for a different result.

• Kier Giles suggests it's time to try something different because the results of what we've been trying so far are very stable and predictable.

The Cycle in the Relationship between West and Russia

Kier Giles describes the cycle in the relationship between West and Russia.

• The cycle starts with high hopes for a new beginning, then drifts and stagnates as incompatible strategic priorities set in.

• There is a period of disillusionment when the West continues to pretend that all is well in the relationship and not listen to Russia's increasing frustration.

• Finally, there's a point of crisis which has resulted in an armed conflict with one of Russia's neighbors.

• Then there's a reset, and the whole thing starts all over again.

• This cycle has been entirely predictable, and crises are getting deeper and worse each time.

Russia's Foreign Policy: Past and Present

In this section, the speaker discusses how Russia's foreign policy has remained consistent over centuries and how it seeks to regain its great power status.

Russia's Aspirations for Great Power Status

• Russia wants to return to the time of 1914 when its aspiration for great power status was recognized by other countries.

• This would give Russia the entitlement to dominate its neighbors and limit their sovereignty.

• The driving attitude behind this is the end of empire that has been postponed.

• Russia seeks to expand its domain through subversion, regime change, and reducing threats by pushing them farther away.

Clash of Attitudes and Assumptions

• The clash between Russia and the West is due to underlying differences in attitudes, assumptions, and geostrategic priorities.

• Some Russian preconceptions and assumptions have not changed since the Soviet Union era.

• Perception is now driving Russian decisions even if the threat from NATO was originally invented to distract from domestic pressures.

Military Transformation

• Russia is preparing for open military clashes with an intense program of military transformation, rearmament, and reorganization.

Recurring Themes in Russian Foreign Policy

In this section, the speaker discusses recurring themes in Russian foreign policy that go back centuries.

Historical Patterns

• Recurring themes about how Russia treats the world and its own citizens can be traced back centuries.

• Descriptions from past centuries are instantly recognizable today.

• The process of expanding Russia's domain continues today through subversion instead of traditional means like military expansion.

Post Imperial Shock

• After losing external dominions several decades ago, Russia has not experienced the post-imperial shock that other post-imperial powers have.

• There hasn't been a readjustment of attitudes to give Russia the same kind of relaxed attitude to its former dominions as other countries have today.

Clash of Attitudes and Assumptions

• The clash between Russia and the West is due to underlying differences in attitudes, assumptions, and geostrategic priorities.

• Some Russian preconceptions and assumptions have not changed since the Soviet Union era.

What Does Russia Want?

In this section, the speaker attempts to answer the question of what Russia wants.

Great Power Status

• Russia seeks to regain its great power status by dominating its neighbors and limiting their sovereignty.

• It wants other countries to recognize its aspiration for great power status.

Expanding Domain

• Russia is preparing for open military clashes with an intense program of military transformation, rearmament, and reorganization.

• It seeks to expand its domain through subversion instead of traditional means like military expansion.

Defensive or Expansionist?

• Whether Russia is driven by defensive motivations or is an unreconstructed expansionist power is no longer relevant because perception is now driving Russian decisions.

Putin and Russia: Understanding the Current Situation

In this section, the speaker discusses the current situation in Russia and emphasizes that it is not just about Putin. He also highlights that despite the drift towards authoritarianism, Russia is still in a period of unprecedented liberalism.

Putin's Role in Russian Security Preoccupations

• The speaker argues that Putin is enacting long-standing Russian security preoccupations and ideas about how to deal with security problems.

• Despite this, he notes that President Putin is not the worst leader that Russia has ever had by many different parameters.

• The current situation, where Russia is not imprisoning or murdering its own or foreign citizens on an industrial scale, is actually hugely a normal issue in Russian history.

Being Careful What We Wish For

• The speaker warns against being too optimistic about change in Russia and cites repeated instances of optimism triumphing over evidence.

• He highlights how wrong people were when they thought things would get better after the forced abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917.

• Instead of aiming for a replacement full of lightning reports, we should learn to live with differences between Western countries and Russia.

Learning to Live With Differences

• The speaker suggests recognizing the fundamental differences between Western countries and Russia instead of pretending there are compatible interests and common views on how to run the world.

• He notes that neither side is going to change anytime soon but learning to live with these differences would lead to a more stable relationship.

• While some may describe this as resembling the late Cold War period, he emphasizes that it's not a new Cold War.

Passing Interest Moments

• The speaker notes that if we are in a new pseudo-Cold War, there are many interest moments we have to pass first in order to establish boundaries and parameters.

• He highlights the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and other defining moments that we have to go through.

Introduction

The speaker introduces the event and requests the audience to switch off their mobile phones.

Discussion Starter

The speaker discusses how difficult it is to package the complexity of Russia in one book and commends Kerr for doing a fantastic job. He then proceeds to ask three questions from different fields, namely Social Anthropology, Sociology, and Political Science.

Bias

• The speaker's bias is having worked on and with Russia for several decades, detecting persistent patterns that validate his hypothesis in the book.

• He believes that people who have a cynical and pessimistic attitude towards Russia make the most accurate predictions about it.

Sources

• The speaker looked through as much evidence as possible to support or disprove his theory. He found that everything he found backed up his theory.

• An early draft of the book was shown to some trusted academic colleagues who suggested that he should quote people less and have more of his own voice coming through it.

How Would I Know If I'm Wrong?

• There are plenty of people who tell him that he's wrong, but they tend not to change their opinion when it turns out that he was right.

• The speaker has tried extremely hard throughout the book to resist determinism and assuming that just because this is how things have always happened means it will happen in the future.

Reactions to the Book

The author discusses the reactions to his book and how they were both predictable and surprising.

Predictable Criticism

• The strongest criticism of the book has come from people who haven't read it or don't care what it says.

• People criticize the subtitle without reading a significant chunk of the book that discusses exactly that issue.

Surprising Reaction

• The way the book was used as bait in a cyber attack on Chatham House was an indirect form of criticism of the book.

• It wasn't actually an attack directly on the book, but using it as a means to attack Chatham House.

Future Criticism

• The main onslaught of criticism is still to come, particularly from the Russian embassy in London.

• Mildly gratifying to see five-star reviews on Amazon and Goodreads racking up.

Benefits of Heads of State Meetings

The author discusses whether meetings between heads of state are beneficial.

• Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting in London some years ago was impressive, but not necessarily an example for us at present.

Systemic Failure of Western Foreign Policy

The author discusses whether there has been a systemic failure of Western foreign policy towards Russia since the collapse of Soviet Union.

• American foreign policy towards Russia after 9/11 appeared to have very little positive response from American government towards Russia.

Importance of Informal Systems in Russia

The author discusses the importance of informal systems in Russia.

• Meetings between heads of state are important not only because a head of state might be impressive, but also because of another aspect of informal systems in Russia.

Putin's Disappointment and Western Misconceptions

The section discusses Putin's disappointment that personal relationships with Western leaders do not translate into positive outcomes for Russia. It also highlights the misconception that once the USSR ended, Russia would seek to rejoin the Western community of nations on the same terms as everyone else.

Personal Relationships with Western Leaders

• Putin is disappointed that personal relationships with Western leaders cannot be leveraged into positive outcomes for Russia.

• One-to-one personal relationships established by Putin do not translate into individuals being able to organize and influence their organizations or countries.

• Democratic checks and balances based on consensus and institutional policies prevent one single individual from determining policy.

Misconception about Post-USSR Russia

• The assumption was widespread that once the USSR ended, Russia would seek to rejoin the Western community of nations on the same terms as everyone else.

• This overlooks the fact that drivers of Russian behavior go far deeper than just changing symbols like flags, anthems, or constitutions.

• There is much more that needs to be done to bring Russia to what the West thinks of as a normal country.

Attitudes towards 9/11

• Russia was entirely genuine in offering help, support, and solidarity after 9/11 due to its decade-long argument against Islamist terrorism.

• However, there were fundamental mismatches between expected demands on the world between Russia and the West which led to squandering this opportunity.

Expansionist Instincts during Gorbachev and Early Yeltsin Period

• Russia's expansionist instincts during the Gorbachev and early Yeltsin periods were just as strong as they are today.

• The instinct to regather the countries of the Soviet Union under Russian control never really stopped, but most of the time, those efforts were ineffective.

The West's Identity and Russia

In this section, the speaker discusses how the West's identity and understanding of the world affects its relationship with Russia. They also touch on how some academics argue that the West is to blame for pushing Russia into certain behaviors.

The Impact of Europe's Net Zero Plan on Russia

• Europe is setting itself on a path to potentially reach net zero by 2050.

• Russian state revenues around 40% from oil and gas.

• As Europe weans itself off natural gas, which it imports from Russia, how will Russia respond financially and politically?

• How will this affect Russia's political engagement with transit countries like Ukraine and Poland?

Expansionist Ideas in Western Leaders

• Will Western leaders accept expansionist ideas from Russia if they engage with them politically?

The Speaker's Optimism About Dealing With Russia

In this section, the speaker clarifies their stance on dealing with Russia. They discuss their lack of optimism about diverting from a repetitive cycle but express hope for eventually achieving a stable relationship with Russia.

The Speaker's Stance on Dealing With Russia

• Despite what may have been implied earlier, the speaker is not an optimist.

• It will continue to be an uphill struggle to deal with Russia due to policy mistakes made by the West.

• Every time things go wrong in the relationship between the West and Russia, it helps people like the speaker pay rent.

• The speaker hopes for a stable relationship with Russia in the future, but it will take decades if not generations to achieve.

Russia's Demographic Collapse

In this section, the speaker discusses how Russia's demographic collapse will impact every aspect of how the country defines itself as a state in a short period of time.

Impact of Demographic Collapse on Russia

• The demographic collapse at the end of the Soviet Union will feed into every single way about how Russia defines itself as a state.

• This change is brewing and has been for several decades.

• If things continue as they are, Russia will be a very different country in 20 or 30 years.

Russia's Challenges and Soft Targets

In this section, the speaker discusses how Russia will address its challenges and soft targets. The past performance indicates that these issues are not addressed before they become critical. The speaker also talks about the possibility of more damaging actions in the future as Russia sees its power declining past a critical point.

Addressing Challenges

• Past performance indicates that Russia's challenges are not addressed before they become critical.

• It is highly likely that there will be more damaging actions in the future as Russia sees its power declining past a critical point.

Soft Targets

• Soft targets such as energy independence and anti-fracking campaigns are being taken on by Russia.

• The speaker believes that it is important to set parameters for what Russia can get away with in terms of damaging other countries.

Conflict Rooted in Foreign and Security Policies

In this section, the speaker discusses how conflict is rooted in foreign and security policies. The West thinks that frontline states should be sovereign independent nations while Russia wishes to see these countries' foreign and security policies constrained.

Conflict Rooted in Foreign and Security Policies

• Conflict is rooted in foreign and security policies.

• The West thinks that frontline states should be sovereign independent nations while Russia wishes to see these countries' foreign and security policies constrained.

NATO Enlargement

• NATO enlargement made a moral choice without considering practical implications because at the time, Russia was not in a position to do anything about it.

• The speaker finds the choice of abandoning morals and values for the sake of acquired life repellent.

Russia's Confrontation

In this section, the speaker discusses Russia's confrontation with NATO and EU. The speaker also talks about the impact of sanctions in the medium and long term.

Russia's Confrontation

• The speaker addresses a question on how much weight should be put on the fact that Russia sometimes feels hemmed in by countries surrounding their borders and also the effect of NATO and EU.

• A question is asked about China's role in relation to Russia.

Impact of Sanctions

• A question is asked about sanctions' impact in the medium and long term.

Nord Stream 2 Project

In this section, a question is asked about Nord Stream 2 project.

Nord Stream 2 Project

• A question is asked about what the speaker thinks of Nord Stream 2 project.

Sanctions and Russia's Behavior

In this section, the speaker discusses how sanctions have impacted Russia's behavior towards its neighbors.

Impact of Sanctions

• The speaker believes that sanctions must be hurting Russia, otherwise they would not be putting so much effort into pretending that they are irrelevant.

• Campaigns to laugh off sanctions have been growing in intensity and volume recently, but the evidence suggests that they are working.

• Sanctions were never supposed to be a quick fix for inducing Russia to change its behavior. Instead, they were a long process of adjusting Russia's calculus for how it should behave in the future# Sanctions and Russia's Behavior

The speaker discusses the impact of sanctions on Russia's behavior towards its neighbors. They argue that sanctions are hurting Russia, despite efforts to downplay their effectiveness.

Sanctions and Their Impact

• Sanctions must be hurting otherwise Russia would not be putting so much effort into pretending that they're irrelevant.

• Campaigns to laugh off sanctions are growing in intensity and volume, but this is just a way to get people to believe that sanctions aren't working.

• Sanctions were never supposed to be a quick fix or a means of inducing Russia to change its behavior quickly. Instead, they were a long process of adjusting Russia's calculus for how it should behave in the future.

• We never know exactly how effective deterrence is until it fails, but overall, sanctions are far less ineffective than media discussions suggest.

China and Russia

• How Russia deals with China will be far more important for its future as a country than how it deals with NATO or the West.

• Moscow wants to avoid Finlandization by keeping friends close and enemies closer, including China. However, being an adjunct of China would threaten Russia's ability to determine its own foreign and security policy.

Nord Stream 2

• The speaker believes Nord Stream 2 is entirely political and has no basis in economic reality. It is just one of many ways in which Russia seeks to increase its leverage over neighboring states by collaborating with whatever interests it can find in Europe.

The Arctic and Russia's Relationship with the West

The speaker discusses the potential for conflict or coercion in the Arctic between Russia and the West.

The Arctic

• The speaker is asked about how they see the Arctic playing out in the relationship between Russia and the West.

• They do not provide a direct answer but suggest that it could be a potential area of conflict or coercion.

• Another speaker, Mary Dejevsky, suggests that what drives Russia to confront the West is a lot of what the West has done.