How Genghis Khan Supplied his Army - Mongol Logistics Documentary

The Logistics of the Mongol Army

This section provides an overview of the logistical capabilities of the Mongol army and their methods of supplying their forces across Eurasia.

The Nomadic Lifestyle and Strategic Logistics

• The Mongols were pastoral nomads, relying on animals such as sheep, goats, oxen, camels, and horses for their logistical needs.

• Their nomadic lifestyle provided them with valuable skills in strategic logistics, including planning seasonal movements and managing pastures to avoid overgrazing.

Grass as a Key Resource

• Grass was abundant in the Eurasian steppes and served as the primary source of nutrition for the Mongols' animals.

• Unlike sedentary societies that required grain or hay to feed larger horse breeds, grass alone sustained the smaller horses of the steppe.

• This allowed the Mongols to field immense herds of horses, giving them a significant advantage over their rivals.

Campaigning Strategies

• Mongol warriors would rotate between multiple horses during campaigns to prevent overexertion.

• While on campaign, separate columns of warriors would travel ahead of a slower-moving main body known as an ordu.

• These columns could strike quickly before returning to resupply on staple foods like dried meat and milk curds.

Predatory Foraging Strategy

• When campaigning against enemies in areas with limited grassland, the Mongols relied on a predatory foraging strategy.

• They spread out across the countryside in divisions and smaller units, feeding their horses on local resources while taking food from peasants' harvests.

• This strategy not only sustained their forces but also spread fear among enemy populations and strained their resources.

Supplying Challenges Beyond Grasslands

This section explores how supplying so many animals posed challenges for the Mongols, especially in drier years or when campaigning far from the steppes.

Overcoming Supply Challenges

• In areas with limited grassland, the Mongols faced difficulties in sustaining their animals.

• They relied on an exceptionally predatory foraging strategy, spreading out across the countryside to feed their horses on smaller areas of grassland and local grain stores.

• This strategy also involved driving peasants from farms and rural villages towards major urban centers, further straining enemy resources.

Resourcefulness and Adaptability

• The Mongols were known for their resourcefulness and ability to make use of all available resources.

• They would eat anything necessary to survive, including meat from dead horses and even bones used for broth.

• Hunting was also practiced to supplement their meals and keep their archery skills sharp.

Conclusion

This section concludes the discussion on the logistical capabilities of the Mongol army and highlights their adaptability and predatory foraging strategy.

Adaptability as a Key Strength

• The Mongols' adaptability to different environments and situations played a crucial role in their logistical success.

• Their nomadic lifestyle provided them with valuable skills in strategic logistics, allowing them to sustain large armies across vast distances.

Predatory Foraging Strategy

• The Mongols' predatory foraging strategy enabled them to sustain their forces even in areas with limited resources.

• By spreading out across the countryside, they could feed both themselves and their horses while putting pressure on enemy populations.

New Section

This section discusses the popular myth that the Mongols were an incredibly fast force, known for their lightning speed. However, calculations by John Masson Smith Jr. show that the speed at which they traveled varied greatly.

Mongols' Speed and Variation

• The Mongolian armies had varying speeds during their campaigns.

• The fastest recorded speed was during Batu and Subutai's invasion of western Eurasia in the 1230s, with an average daily speed of around 27 kilometers per day.

• Other campaigns had an average speed of around 22-24 kilometers per day.

• Hulegu's march in the 1250s covered approximately 15 kilometers per day, with variations depending on the terrain and other factors.

Factors Affecting Speed

• Steppe horses required time for grazing and sleep, limiting the top speed of these armies.

• Supplies played a crucial role in maintaining the army's speed and efficiency. Great Khan Mongke ordered vast depots of supplies to be made along Hulegu's route.

• Roads were cleared, bridges built or repaired, and ferries prepared to aid in their passage. Pastures were cleared for horses' needs.

• Marches were carefully timed to avoid harsh weather conditions and take advantage of available pastures.

New Section

This section explores how Mongol soldiers obtained their weapons and armors during their conquests.

Arming of Mongol Soldiers

• Each Mongol soldier was responsible for producing and maintaining their own base equipment, such as bows, arrows, and saddles.

• At the start of the conquests, blacksmithing in Mongolia was challenging due to limited access to raw materials. Specialized equipment like swords and full sets of metal armors were uncommon.

• As the empire expanded, the Mongols gained access to more varied weapons and armors through looting, tribute, forced migrations of artisans, and craftsmen.

• Chinggis Khan's orders were to collect and redistribute weapons and armor from defeated enemy forces.

New Section

This section discusses the impact of Mongol campaigns on families and their assimilation into local cultures.

Family Separation and Assimilation

• The family separation policy of the Khans resulted in many Mongolian families being permanently separated during campaigns.

• Tamma garrisons stationed on the frontiers often took local wives and mixed with local cultures due to traveling without their original families.

• The rapid absorption of Mongols into Turkic and Farsi peoples in the west of the empire can be attributed in part to this family separation policy.

Made of mainly captured and relocated Chinese craftsmen, Chinqai turned this into one of several “manufacturing centres” in Mongolia. Both a farming settlement and weapons production facility, it supplied Chinggis’ host as they moved west for the invasion of Khwarezm. Even the imperial capital, Karakorum, had smithies and arms producers. It is unclear to what extent these finished products actually made their way to the regular soldiers, outside of arrow production. By providing their warriors millions of iron tipped arrows, the Khans would have been giving New Section

This section discusses the manufacturing centers in Mongolia during Chinggis Khan's time and how they supplied weapons to his army.

Manufacturing Centers in Mongolia

• The city of Chinqai was one of several manufacturing centers in Mongolia.

• It was made up mainly of captured and relocated Chinese craftsmen.

• Chinqai served as both a farming settlement and a weapons production facility.

• It supplied weapons to Chinggis Khan's army as they moved west for the invasion of Khwarezm.

Uncertainty about Distribution

• It is unclear how many finished products from the manufacturing centers actually reached the regular soldiers.

• Outside of arrow production, it is uncertain if other weapons were distributed to the soldiers.

Iron Tipped Arrows

• The Khans provided their warriors with millions of iron-tipped arrows.

• This was seen as an effective way to assist their soldiers in battle.

No evidence seems to indicate there was ever a concerted effort to armour the vast majority of Mongol troops or provide them a regular kit, though the soldiers were expected to have some base equipment such as knives, bows, ropes, sewing kits and other basic tools. The Franciscan Friar William of Rubruck, during his return journey to Europe from the court of the Grand Khan in the early 1250s, had only two of the twenty Mongols assigned to New Section

This section discusses the lack of armor and regular equipment for Mongol troops, as well as the basic equipment they were expected to have.

Lack of Armor and Regular Kit

• There was no concerted effort to armor the majority of Mongol troops or provide them with a regular kit.

• It is unclear if most soldiers had access to armor or standardized equipment.

Basic Equipment

• Soldiers were expected to have some base equipment such as knives, bows, ropes, sewing kits, and other basic tools.

Example from William of Rubruck's Journey

• During his return journey from the court of the Grand Khan in the early 1250s, Friar William of Rubruck observed that only two out of twenty Mongols assigned to protect him were armored.

• These two Mongols wore hauberks made of maille from the Alans of the Northern Caucasus.

Other travellers such as John de Plano Carpini and Marco Polo also indicate that outside of the Khan’s keshig, little effort was made to furnish the regular army with equipment. Communication between their forces was an important tool of the Khans. In this, they developed one of history’s most famous postal systems, the yam. Situated on average roughly 30 kilometres apart, New Section

This section discusses how little effort was made to provide equipment for the regular army and highlights communication as an important tool for the Khans.

Lack of Effort in Equipping Regular Army

• Outside of Chinggis Khan's personal guard (keshig), little effort was made to furnish the regular army with equipment.

• Other travelers like John de Plano Carpini and Marco Polo also noted this lack of equipment provision.

Importance of Communication

• Communication between Mongol forces was crucial.

• The Mongols developed one of history's most famous postal systems called the yam.

The Yam Postal System

• The yam consisted of relay stations known as ortoo, situated approximately 30 kilometers apart on average.

• These stations were supplied by local communities and served as points for messengers to exchange written or verbal communication.

• Messengers would ride furiously from station to station, being resupplied and jumping onto fresh horses along the way.

The yam system may have been brought to Chinggis Khan’s attention by defectors from the Jin Empire, be they Chinese, Jurchen or Khitan, or they may have organically emerged out of necessity of retaining some semblance of authority over the ever-growing empire. No matter the origin, Chinggis Khan had recognized New Section

This section discusses the possible origins of the yam postal system and highlights Chinggis Khan's recognition of its utility.

Possible Origins of the Yam System

• The yam system may have been brought to Chinggis Khan's attention by defectors from the Jin Empire, including Chinese, Jurchen, or Khitan individuals.

• Alternatively, it may have organically emerged out of necessity to maintain authority over the expanding empire.

Chinggis Khan's Recognition

• Regardless of its origin, Chinggis Khan recognized the utility and importance of the yam system by the 1210s.

The yam was expanded over the course of the thirteenth century, particularly under Ogedai and Mongke but continually disrupted and a source of frustration for New Section

This section discusses how the yam postal system expanded during Ogedai and Mongke's reigns but faced disruptions and frustrations.

Expansion of the Yam System

• The yam postal system expanded throughout the thirteenth century, especially during the reigns of Ogedai and Mongke.

Disruptions and Frustrations

• Despite its expansion, the yam system faced continuous disruptions.

• Locals had to supply the yam stations, which became a source of frustration due to greedy officials and merchants taking advantage of their generosity.

Marginal Presence in the Empire

• Even at the height of the Great Khans' authority, the presence of the yam system was marginal in many parts of the empire.

Connecting Far-Flung Sections

• The yam system provided a means to connect different sections of the empire and maintain contact between armies carrying out Chinggis Khan's orders.

Via the yam, orders could be relayed across New Section

This section discusses how orders were relayed through the yam postal system for organizing timetables, censuses, troop demands, and supplies mobilization.

Relaying Orders via Yam

• The yam postal system allowed for orders to be relayed across the empire.

• It facilitated organizing timetables for various tasks such as censuses carried out on Mongke's orders.

• Troop demands and supplies mobilization could also be communicated through the yam system.

Example: Hulegu's Campaign

• Hulegu was able to meet up with more contingents and stock food depots without delays due to efficient communication via the yam.

• When Hulegu reached Maymundiz fortress, forces sent from Jochid ulus were able to cross the Caucasus and unite with him in northern Iran.

Our series on New Section

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Conclusion

• The series on the Mongol army will continue in future videos.

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