Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia

Nuclear Proliferation Risks in East Asia and Their Regional Implications

The panel discusses the risks of nuclear proliferation in East Asia and their regional implications. They also explore possible instruments to manage or control these risks.

Introduction

• Peggy Mason introduces herself as the moderator.

• She introduces the panelists: Jenny Town, Jeffrey Lewis, Andrew Latham, and Lamy Kim.

Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula

• Given North Korea's relentless increase in its levels of nuclear and missile capability, is denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula still achievable?

• One panelist believes that denuclearization is now clearly a fantasy.

• The panel discusses other arms control approaches that might be pursued.

• Is there any potential for U.S and China working together on this challenge?

Regional Responses

• The panel discusses regional responses to nuclear proliferation risks in East Asia.

• They mention the enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, UK, and US which includes the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered submarines.

• China's opaque plans for increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal are also mentioned.

Conclusion

• The panel concludes with a discussion about how to manage or control nuclear proliferation risks in East Asia.

Pursuing Denuclearization vs Arms Control Deal with North Korea

The speakers discuss whether the US should continue pursuing denuclearization as a policy objective or pursue an arms control deal with North Korea instead.

Feasible Goal for Sound Policy Making

• Pursuing denuclearization as a policy objective is important for sound policy making.

Costs of Arms Control Deal

• An arms control deal would mean recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, which could undermine the US's global efforts.

• It could lead to other countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey pursuing nuclear weapons.

• South Korea and Japan may also feel betrayed if the US only seeks to defend itself but disregards their security concerns. This would undermine the credibility of the US as their security partner.

Collaboration with China Unlikely

• Collaboration between the US and China for North Korea's denuclearization is unlikely due to intensifying US-China great power competition and ties among authoritarian regimes like China, Russia, and North Korea becoming more solidified.

• Without China's support, sanctions are not going to be effective.

Need for Change in Approach towards Disarmament Challenge in North Korea

The speakers discuss how the approach towards tackling North Korea's disarmament challenge needs to change.

Non-Proliferation Approach Ineffective

• The non-proliferation approach used over the past 30 years has been ineffective in preventing North Korea from getting nuclear weapons.

• A disarmament challenge requires a different approach than non-proliferation.

Convincing North Korea to Disarm Challenging

• Convincing a country that has weaker military and nuclear weapons program, living in a nuclearized neighborhood, and whose political system is at odds with the world system to disarm is challenging.

• North Korea needs to trust that if they disarm, they will be safe. This is a tall order, especially after examples of Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine.

Need for Flipping Security Trends

• Security trends in South Korea are not conducive to weaker countries disarming.

• Until security trends flip, an effective approach towards North Korea's disarmament challenge cannot be achieved.

• The consequences of being ineffective include countries like South Korea and Japan considering their nuclear options.

The Current State of North Korea

This section discusses the current state of North Korea and how it has changed over time.

Changes in North Korea

• The North Korea that exists today is not the same as the one that existed in the 1990s.

• In 2018, there was a window of opportunity where North Korea saw value in trying to change its relationship with other countries, but that sentiment seems to be gone now.

• Arms control approach is not just unilateral North Korea making moves on their disarmament and putting limitations on their own arms development.

Arms Control Approach

This section discusses why an arms control approach may not work for North Korea.

Skepticism about Arms Control Approach

• Starting at incredible disparity between U.S capabilities and North Korean capabilities makes an arms control approach difficult.

• An arms control approach would require the U.S and South Korea possibly even Japan to also be willing to make security concessions that would somehow convince the North Koreans that this is the right choice.

• There's no appetite to even talk about security concessions at this point in time.

Creating a Positive Relationship with North Korea

This section discusses how we can create a positive relationship with North Korea.

Building Trust

• We need to think about how we can create an environment and kind of relationship that would allow North Korea to make different decisions.

• It will take moves that start to build a more positive relationship, which aren't necessarily going to be tied to specific moves that North Korea does on denuclearization.

• If we continue to approach this issue that North Korea always has to move first, we will continue to stay in stalemate.

Denuclearization of North Korea

This section discusses why denuclearization of North Korea is not achievable.

Denuclearization is a Fantasy

• Denuclearization is not achievable and it has been so for many years.

• The very fact that the North Koreans chose the term denuclearization tells you much of what you need to know which is that they never use the word disarmament because by denuclearization what they meant was a process that applied to all parties.

• Kim Jong-un never offered to disarm for Donald Trump.

North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

In this section, the speakers discuss North Korea's nuclear program and its ambitions. They also talk about the failed negotiations with the United States and China's role in the situation.

North Korea's Nuclear Program

• North Korea has an ambitious program for modernizing its nuclear forces.

• The country has conducted missile exercises designed as a nuclear preemptive strike.

• Kim Jong-un has made it clear that he will not bargain away his nuclear capability because he believes that the United States poses a threat to him.

• North Korea believes that their best hope of surviving is through large-scale use of short and medium-range nuclear weapons against U.S forces in South Korea and Japan.

Failed Negotiations

• Diplomacy ended when the United States insisted on disarmament during negotiations in Hanoi.

• Instead of focusing on convincing North Korea to disarm, reducing tension on the peninsula is crucial.

• Talking to North Koreans about how they think about nuclear weapons can help reduce misunderstandings.

China's Role

• The idea that China can solve all problems related to North Korea is unrealistic.

• The more isolated North Korea becomes, the more important their weapons are to them.

• Organizing China to act contrary to North Korean interests may underline how hostile the world is towards them.

Motivations Behind Actions on Both Sides of Inner Korean Border

In this section, one speaker discusses how states are motivated by honor, fear, and interest. They also talk about how these motivations are on display on both sides of the inner Korean border.

Motivations

• States are always motivated by honor, fear, and interest.

• On the Northern side of the peninsula, there is insecurity and a pursuit of status and prestige.

• On the Southern side of the peninsula, there is fear of North Korea's actions.

Pursuit of Power

• Kim Jong-un's actions are all about power.

• The latest spasm of missile launches is a way for North Korea to show that they matter in an international system where only big boys have nuclear weapons.

North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal

The speaker discusses the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the potential for South Korea to acquire their own nuclear weapons capability.

Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation

• North Korea is engaging in vertical proliferation by increasing the size of their nuclear arsenal and improving the quality of warheads and delivery systems.

• The potential for South Korea to acquire their own nuclear weapons capability is an example of horizontal proliferation, which can be destabilizing.

• There are no indications that either government is moving towards disarmament or non-proliferation.

Lack of Optimism

• The speaker expresses pessimism about finding reasons to be optimistic regarding disarmament or non-proliferation efforts.

• However, there is optimism in recognizing that denuclearization may not be a realistic goal, allowing for more effective approaches to be explored.

Concerns About South Korea and Japan

• There are concerns about South Korea and Japan acquiring their own independent nuclear weapons capability.

• While this would not necessarily make them pariah states, it could strain relationships with other countries.

• Both countries are increasing defense budgets and investing in conventional defenses, missile defense systems, ISR capabilities, long-range precision strike capabilities, submarine launch ballistic missiles, drones, cross-domain capabilities, cyber defenses.

South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

This section discusses South Korea's nuclear ambitions and the factors driving them.

Factors Driving South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

• Rising public support for formally debating the reversal of their peace Constitution.

• Fear of North Korea's nuclear weapons and its playing of big Power Politics as a small country with no economy.

• Withdrawal of U.S troops from Afghanistan, showing that it is possible to withdraw troops even after being there for a long time.

• No formal mechanism during wartime guarantees that the U.S president will consult with the South Korean president before making decisions about using nuclear weapons.

• Heightened anxieties in South Korea due to X factors such as population density, preemptive nuclear use by North Korea, and lack of transparency into U.S strategic planning.

Trilateral Cooperation

• Increase in trilateral cooperation between U.S, Japan, and South Korea through bilateral consultations, military exercises, and investment in standoff missile capabilities.

South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

In this section, the speakers discuss South Korea's potential nuclear ambitions and the factors that may influence its decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

Risks of Pursuing Nuclear Weapons

• The risks associated with pursuing nuclear weapons include issues such as where they would be stored and whether it would make South Korea a target for North Korea.

• There is also uncertainty about U.S political stability, which could impact South Korea's reliance on the U.S.

• Contingency planning is underway due to concerns about the consistency and sustainability of U.S support for alliances.

Japan vs. South Korea

• Japan is unlikely to build nuclear weapons due to a strong allergy towards them, while South Korea does not have the same aversion.

• Washington may force South Korea to choose between the alliance and nuclear weapons, but it is not clear if this will happen given past examples of loosening restrictions.

Public Opinion in South Korea

• Over 70% of South Koreans support acquiring nuclear weapons, with most preferring indigenous options over redeployment of USS tactical nuclear weapons.

• Despite public opinion, there are still high costs associated with pursuing nuclear weapons that may deter the government from doing so.

South Korea's Strategy to Deal with North Korean Nuclear Threats

The lack of nuclear weapons in South Korea means that they rely on conventional weapons. This makes North Korea nervous as South Korea is far superior in terms of conventional capabilities. There has been a change in Washington's attitude towards the possibility of South Korea going nuclear, and there are concerns about the US's ability to respond effectively if there is a contingency in Taiwan.

• South Korea relies on Conventional Weapons due to the lack of nuclear weapons.

• North Korea is nervous because South Korea is far superior in terms of conventional capabilities.

• Washington's attitude towards the possibility of South Korea going nuclear has changed.

• Concerns about the US's ability to respond effectively if there is a contingency in Taiwan.

Factors Influencing South Korea's Decision to Go Nuclear

There are systemic pressures pushing South Korea towards going nuclear, but there are also countervailing pressures such as domestic politics, national identity, and norms against becoming a pariah state. China imposing sanctions on South Korea could also be a countervailing pressure.

• Systemic pressures are pushing South Korea towards going nuclear.

• Domestic politics and national identity can act as countervailing pressures against going nuclear.

• Norms against becoming a pariah state can act as countervailing pressures against going nuclear.

• China imposing sanctions on South Korea could also be a countervailing pressure.

Inhibitors to Denuclearization

This section discusses the inhibitors to denuclearization in North Korea and South Korea.

Inhibitors to Denuclearization

• Technical capability is an inhibitor to denuclearization in North Korea.

• The reliability of the United States nuclear umbrella is an inhibitor to denuclearization in South Korea.

• The credibility of the promise made by the United States is a vexing issue with respect to Western Europe during the Cold War.

Reduction of Nuclear Risks

This section discusses practical ways of reducing nuclear risks.

Reducing Nuclear Risks

• Jeffrey suggests that there are two conversations that need to be had with North Korea: one about what a more normal relationship looks like, and another about how they think about nuclear weapons and under what conditions they would use them.

• Economic leverage can be used as an incentive for better behavior out of North Korea, even if they do not disarm their nuclear weapons.

• The current cycle of escalation between North and South Korea is not reducing nuclear risk.

Mediation in the US-North Korea Conflict

In this section, the speakers discuss the need for mediation in the US-North Korea conflict and suggest that a focus on tension reduction is necessary before disarmament can be considered.

The Need for Mediation

• The speakers suggest that mediation may be necessary to resolve the conflict between the US, South Korea, and North Korea.

• They note that it may be difficult to find a neutral party to mediate.

• The speakers emphasize the importance of focusing on tension reduction and risk reduction in the near term before disarmament can be considered.

Sanctions Relief

• The speaker suggests that sanctions relief could be exchanged for freezing North Korea's nuclear missile capabilities.

• However, they note that South Korea and Japan may still feel insecure as long as the US does not take action to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons.

China's Nuclear Modernization Efforts

In this section, Jeffrey Lewis discusses China's nuclear modernization efforts and whether they imply any changes to its current no first use doctrine.

Changes to China's Nuclear Doctrine?

• Jeffrey Lewis notes that China has undergone significant changes in its nuclear forces over time.

• He explains how China has gone from having only old liquid-fueled ballistic missiles with separate warheads to deploying new generations of solid propellant ballistic missiles.

• Lewis suggests that there will likely be many more mobile missiles deployed but notes that we still don't know if all silos will be filled.

• He raises the question of whether China's nuclear forces will come to resemble its conventional forces, which have a more offensive doctrine.

China's Nuclear Arsenal

In this section, the speakers discuss China's nuclear arsenal and the lack of transparency surrounding it. They also explore the reasons behind China's expansion of its nuclear forces.

The Role of ABM Treaty in Arms Control

• The Bush administration's decision to leave the ABM Treaty in 2003 is identified as a foundational factor for the expansion of China's nuclear forces.

• The arms control community spent years talking about how the ABM Treaty was the foundation of arms control, but when it was removed, they were optimistic that everything would be fine.

• It has taken a long time to see the consequences of removing the ABM Treaty, but if there is any factor responsible for China's expansion in nuclear forces, it is because they believe that the US does not accept that they have a nuclear deterrent.

Great Power Competition and Strategic Stability

• Great power competition and fear that the US is working on an anti-ballistic missile infrastructure that will deny China an assured second strike capability are reasonable concerns.

• A quantitative increase in their nuclear arsenal may be China's best strategy to stabilize their deterrent relationship with America.

• Qualitative shifts such as hypersonics and gliders designed to overcome any American anti-ballistic missile defense system are also contributing factors to China's growing capabilities.

Canada and American Ballistic Missile Defense Arrangement

• There is a lobby in Canada which sees defense benefits supply benefits and industry interest in joining America’s ballistic missile defense arrangement.

• Russia and China fear that their retaliatory capability will be destroyed if Canada joins America’s ballistic missile defense arrangement.

The August Nuclear and Missile Technology Proliferation

This section discusses the transfer of nuclear missile technology to Australia and its impact on relationships between the US and allies such as Japan and South Korea.

Precedent for Nuclear Proliferation

• The August nuclear and missile technology proliferation presents a potential threat to the relationships between the US and allies such as Japan and South Korea.

• Other players in the region, such as India and ASEAN, are reacting or changing their calculus in response to this.

China's Nuclear Arsenal Expansion

• China's modernization or expansion of its nuclear arsenal is driven by its desire to enhance its survivable nuclear deterrent capabilities.

• Expanding its nuclear capabilities would push away convince other countries that power is shifting toward China.

South Korea's Reaction

• South Korean experts expressed disappointment because they were pursuing the nuclear powers of Marines but were not allowed by the United States.

• The US transferring this technology to Australia doesn't really pose a great proliferation threat because Australia doesn't have nuclear capabilities.

Reactions from India and ASEAN Countries

• India sees it as an opportunity to counter China both on land and at sea.

• Some ASEAN countries support the deal while others do not welcome it.

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Canada's Role in Reducing Nuclear Risks

In this section, the panelists discuss Canada's role in reducing nuclear risks and managing the reality of a nuclear-armed DPRK. They also talk about the importance of norms set by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Canada's Role in Risk Management and Reduction

• Panelist suggests that Canada can play a constructive role in bringing parties together to build confidence, reduce insecurity, and manage the reality of a nuclear-armed DPRK.

• Panelist is more hopeful about Canada playing a constructive role with respect to risk management and reduction than disarming North Korea or preventing proliferation in South Korea.

Discouraging South Korea from Going Nuclear

• Panelist highlights that Canada can play an important role in discouraging South Korea from going nuclear by using its influence to establish non-nuclear proliferation regimes.

• Non-nuclear weapon states enjoy more legitimacy and moral high ground than nuclear weapon states when it comes to norms. Therefore, they can play a more important role.

Importance of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

• The panelists agree on the centrality of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to inhibiting nuclear proliferation.

Audience Questions

In this section, an audience member asks two questions related to normalizing relations with North Korea and mitigating risks while avoiding giving into autocratic states' demands.

Normalizing Relations with North Korea

• An audience member asks if normalizing relations with North Korea could incentivize other actors such as Iran to accelerate their nuclear program.

• Panelist argues that the logic of the Iranian nuclear program is internal to Iran and reflects its domestic politics first and foremost.

Mitigating Risks without Giving into Autocratic States' Demands

• An audience member asks how to mitigate risks while avoiding giving into autocratic states' demands.

• Panelist suggests that the example one sets is not a significant factor in influencing other actors. Domestic politics are almost always at the forefront of concerns, followed by immediate regional considerations.

International Relations and North Korea

In this section, the speakers discuss the complexity of international relations and how it affects North Korea. They also talk about the impact of political transitions on foreign policy.

Complexity of International Relations

• The speakers discuss how international relations are complex and that there are usually enough factors going on that make it difficult to draw conclusions.

• They mention that the example effect is usually fairly small, citing Iran's signing up for a deal similar to one the US had walked away from with North Korea.

• The speakers acknowledge that there are many governments around the world where they wouldn't want to live, but some of those governments are considered friends by their countries.

Impact of Political Transitions

• The speakers note that different administrations have different policies towards other countries, which can drastically change every four to eight years in the US or every five years in South Korea.

• They suggest changing how we talk about North Korea and focusing on how certain choices serve US interests, Canada's interests, or South Korea's interests.

Human Rights Record and Reducing Tensions

• The speakers acknowledge North Korea's terrible human rights record but argue that having a constant hostile relationship doesn't improve people's livelihood in North Korea.

• They suggest finding ways to reduce tensions so aid and nutritional assistance can be delivered to improve people's lives even if it doesn't turn into a democratic paradise.

• The speakers believe that reducing tensions would make your average person in North Korea's life measurably better.

Flipping the Script

The speaker talks about how different moves, even if they weren't willing to make them before, can serve our interests over time.

Different Moves Can Serve Our Interests Over Time

• Different moves can eventually serve our interests.

• Appeasement is not a valid comparison to current situations as it is founded on nothing but mythology.

• There is no academic literature that supports the idea of a proliferation cascade if we give in to one nuclear state.

• Systemic pressures that would incline lots of states to go nuclear are mediated by domestic politics.

Domestic Politics Mediate Systemic Pressures

• Domestic politics mediate systemic pressures and touch down in very specific ways.

• North Korea's whole logic behind its nuclear weapons program is just different than it is in Iran or South Korea.

• The speaker is not concerned about either appeasement or a proliferation cascade.

Conclusion

• The panelists wrap up the discussion with an optimistic note.