The 12 Causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The 12 Causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Causes of the Russia-Ukraine War

Overview of the Conflict

  • The war between Russia and Ukraine is currently the most significant global issue, with over three months of conflict revealing deeper underlying causes.
  • The exploration of this conflict will unfold in four phases: substantive issues, limitations of easy explanations, reasons for failed bargaining, and implications for potential resolutions.

Substantive Causes

Separatist Regions

  • Tensions in Ukraine date back to the 2004 Presidential election where pro-West candidate Viktor Yushchenko faced pro-East candidate Viktor Yanukovych.
  • The election results were contested due to alleged fraud, leading to a rerun where Yushchenko ultimately won amidst regional divisions favoring different candidates.

Euromaidan Crisis

  • In 2013, protests erupted when Yanukovych shifted from a trade deal with the EU to supporting Russia's Eurasian Economic Union, culminating in his flight to Russia and Crimea's annexation by Russia.
  • Following these events, two regions declared independence—Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic—leading to ongoing conflict.

Continuation of Conflict

  • Political scientists classify this as a continuation rather than an interstate war due to the absence of regular Russian troops; however, private Russian involvement was significant.

Strategic Objectives

Crimean Land Bridge

  • Crimea functions as an island territory for Russia; prior access was limited until the construction of the Crimean Bridge began in 2016.
  • Control over land along the Dnipro River towards Donbas became crucial after Mariupol fell on May 20, 2022.

Russian Irredentism

  • Irredentism refers to reclaiming previously held territories; Putin’s ambitions may extend beyond just Crimea towards reestablishing Soviet-era borders.

Broader Geopolitical Context

East-West Rivalry

  • The conflict may symbolize a larger struggle between Russia and Western influence post-Cold War as NATO expanded eastward since 1997.

Energy Dependence and Market Power

Europe's Reliance on Russian Energy

  • Europe currently relies heavily on Russia for its energy needs, continuing to purchase fuel despite economic sanctions.
  • This dependency grants Russia significant market power, allowing it to profit from its geographic proximity to Europe.
  • Ukraine possesses substantial untapped oil and gas reserves but is unable to supply Europe due to ongoing conflict.

Ukraine's Natural Gas Reserves

  • Ukraine ranks second in proven natural gas reserves in Europe, trailing only Norway.
  • If able to extract and sell these resources, Ukraine could become a major competitor in the energy market; however, this remains uncertain due to the war.
  • The conflict hinders international partnerships necessary for extraction projects, further entrenching Russia's market dominance.

Water Crisis in Crimea

Impact of Annexation on Water Supply

  • Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine dammed the canal that supplied water to the region, leading to severe shortages.
  • The agricultural sector suffers significantly from these shortages, with estimated losses exceeding $200 million annually.
  • The war has allowed Russia to destroy infrastructure like the canal while securing future access to water resources.

The Propaganda Narrative: Denazification Claims

Examination of Putin's Justifications

  • Putin’s stated goal of "demilitarization and denazification" of Ukraine is scrutinized; while neo-Nazi groups exist in Ukraine, they lack political power or support.
  • Notably, Ukrainian President Zelensky is Jewish and has family ties to Holocaust victims, undermining claims about widespread fascism in Ukraine.

Historical Context and Propaganda

  • The narrative surrounding Nazis serves as propaganda within Russia, linking current conflicts with historical victories during World War II (Victory Day).
  • This connection aims at rallying domestic support for the war effort but does not accurately reflect the reasons behind the conflict itself.

Understanding Conflict Causes

Complexity Beyond Simplistic Explanations

  • Seven areas of dispute between Russia and Ukraine are identified; however, none fully explain the ongoing conflict—collectively they represent partial causes rather than complete explanations.

Territorial Disputes as a Case Study

  • Various potential post-conflict borders illustrate that neither side stands to gain more territory through continued fighting; peace could prevent further loss of life and resources.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of War vs Peace

  • A theoretical framework suggests that any division of territory between conflicting parties could be mutually preferable compared to ongoing warfare due to associated costs (lives lost and financial inefficiencies).

The Dynamics of War and Peace

The Concept of Joint Ventures in Conflict Resolution

  • The speaker proposes that if Russia feels threatened by European energy, a joint company could be formed to drill wells and share profits, drawing on historical precedents.
  • Reference is made to Percy Cox, a British High Commissioner who created an arbitrary neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which later led to a joint venture for oil extraction when oil was discovered in 1938.
  • Despite the division of the neutral zone in 1965, revenue sharing from oil continues based on earlier agreements, illustrating how autonomy can lead to peaceful resolutions.

Understanding the Rarity of Wars

  • The speaker emphasizes that wars are puzzling because numerous settlements exist that could benefit both parties more than conflict; thus, wars are rare with an average probability well below 1%.
  • To understand why wars occur, one must identify what parties are fighting over and recognize "bargaining friction" that prevents negotiated settlements.

Preventive vs. Preemptive War

  • Preventive war is discussed as a common explanation for current conflicts; Putin's rationale is based on Ukraine's ties with NATO potentially shifting power dynamics.
  • A visual representation shows how Russia perceives its military advantage diminishing if Ukraine joins NATO, prompting preemptive action while conditions favor them.

Historical Context of Preemptive Wars

  • The speaker notes parallels with past events like Georgia's overtures towards NATO leading to Russian invasion in 2008 as a preventive measure against perceived threats.
  • Putin’s claims about Ukraine seeking nuclear capabilities add complexity to bargaining problems but lack substantiation regarding actual steps taken by Ukraine.

Game Theory and Power Dynamics

  • Distinctions between preventive (long-term shifts in power balance) and preemptive wars (exploiting first-strike advantages), illustrated through historical examples like World War I.
  • The discussion highlights how initiating war can significantly alter power dynamics between nations, leading to incompatible demands that result in conflict.

Conclusion: Implications for Future Conflicts

  • The analysis concludes with reflections on the rarity of preemptive wars historically but acknowledges their potential impact on international relations today.

The Dynamics of War: Miscalculations and Rationality

The Context of Military Actions

  • Israel's preemptive actions during perceived imminent threats highlight a historical pattern, as seen in the Korean War where China’s intervention surprised the U.S., preventing a total victory for South Korea.
  • The concept of first-strike advantage is questioned, especially given Russia's unofficial involvement in ongoing conflicts like those in Donbas, suggesting that Putin's framing may serve more as public relations than strategic reality.

Miscalculations by Putin

  • Putin significantly underestimated Ukraine's resistance, believing that a force of around 200,000 Russian troops would easily overpower Ukrainian defenses.
  • With Ukraine also fielding approximately 200,000 armed forces, the attacking-to-defending ratio was unfavorable for Russia; effective occupation requires more personnel than deployed.
  • Putin assumed Ukrainians would welcome Russian forces as liberators and that President Zelensky could be swiftly removed. Instead, Zelensky emerged as a unifying figure for resistance.

Strategic Misunderstandings

  • The miscalculation extends to how both sides perceive military strength; if Russia believed it had an advantageous position while Ukraine did not, this led to unrealistic expectations regarding negotiations and outcomes.
  • These rational actor theories suggest states can act strategically yet still find themselves embroiled in conflict due to misjudgments about power dynamics.

Exploring Irrationality

  • Arguments claiming irrationality in Putin’s decision-making are critiqued; they suggest his territorial ambitions are nonsensical and imply mental instability due to poor war outcomes.
  • However, distinguishing between unconventional preferences and irrational behavior is crucial; Putin has historically been calculated in his political maneuvers.

Domestic Implications of War

  • Despite setbacks on the battlefield, domestic support for Putin surged post-invasion. Approval ratings rose from 67.2% before the war to 81.6%, indicating successful manipulation of national sentiment.
  • This rally-around-the-flag effect suggests that even if costs are high for citizens, they do not directly impact Putin’s power consolidation strategy or his ability to negotiate from a position of strength.

Personal Gains from Conflict

Understanding the Causes of War

Speculation on War Dynamics

  • The discussion begins with the acknowledgment that personal benefits can make war seem efficient, reducing opportunities for negotiation.
  • It is noted that multiple factors likely contribute to the onset of war, complicating efforts to identify a single driving force until historical analysis occurs post-conflict.

Substantive Causes and Military Outcomes

  • The speaker argues that if wars were solely based on substantive causes, they would typically last longer due to military defeat being a common resolution.
  • Ukraine's current military limitations are highlighted; it lacks the capacity to invade Russia effectively, while Russia's ability to defeat Ukraine remains uncertain given its recent struggles.

Changes in Preferences and Economic Impact

  • A shift in preferences could lead to an end of conflict; however, both Zelensky and Putin are unlikely to abandon their territorial interests.
  • U.S. sanctions aim to weaken Russia economically, potentially leading to internal challenges against Putin’s regime as economic conditions worsen.

Public Perception and Leadership Challenges

  • Public perception of the war's success may change as soldiers return home, reminiscent of domestic unrest during past conflicts like the Soviet-Afghan War.
  • The possibility of a coup against Putin is discussed but complicated by his current popularity among Russians.

Leadership Changes and Conflict Resolution

  • Historical examples illustrate how new leadership can alter bargaining dynamics; leaders not tied to previous conflicts may pursue peace more readily.
  • New leaders might prioritize different issues or have less at stake in ongoing wars, facilitating negotiations that were previously impossible.

Preventive Motivations and Future Implications

  • Ending wars does not always require military defeat; preventive motivations often stem from shifts in power dynamics rather than direct conflict outcomes.

NATO Membership and Russia's Strategic Concerns

NATO's Precondition for Membership

  • NATO requires member states to resolve land disputes prior to joining, exemplified by Russia's invasion of Georgia when it showed interest in NATO.
  • Russia may be concerned about Western arms transfers to Ukraine, which could escalate tensions even without formal NATO membership.

Analysis of Russian Military Tactics

  • Initial Russian tactics involved a broad invasion strategy; however, Ukraine successfully repelled the attack on Kyiv and pushed back forces in the south.
  • Instead of targeting broader Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia has focused on securing the land bridge along the Sea of Azov since April.

Preventive Military Strategy

  • Russia might aim to establish defensible territory while anticipating a long-term military buildup in Ukraine.
  • The concept of "convergence" suggests that both sides will eventually recognize preferable settlement options over continued conflict as they learn from ongoing events.

Misjudgments and Tactical Shifts

  • Putin initially underestimated Ukrainian resistance, believing in a swift victory; early war developments contradicted this assumption.
  • Current battles around the Sea of Azov indicate a shift in strategy but show minimal territorial changes, suggesting limited new insights for either side.

Future Uncertainties Impacting Conflict Duration

  • Questions remain regarding Ukraine’s ability to mobilize its citizens effectively and sustain Western support amidst changing global news cycles.
Video description

Check out my new book "What Caused the Russia-Ukraine War? (And How Will It End?)" on Amazon (paid link): https://amzn.to/3OIXk6E What caused the Russo-Ukrainian War? This video tackles that question in four phases. First, we examine the substantive reasons Russia invaded Ukraine. Second, I explain why those reasons are collectively a half-cause for war. Third, we switch gears to discuss bargaining problems. Finally, we will investigate what each of these explanations implies for how the war will end. 0:00 Outline 1:19 Separatist Regions 3:54 Crimean Land Bridge 5:02 Russian Irredentism 6:42 East-West Rivalry 7:49 Energy 9:36 Water 10:34 Nazis 12:20 Substantive Explanations Are Half-Causes 12:54 Visualizing War's Expected Outcome (LINES ON MAPS) 14:21 Costs Incentivize Bargaining 15:09 Bargaining over Oil 17:00 Bargaining over Autonomy 17:34 Why War Is Puzzling 18:52 Preventive War and Shifting Power 21:00 Preemptive War and First Strikes 24:20 Uncertainty and Miscalculation 26:24 Rational, Unitary Actor Explanations for War 27:05 Irrationality 29:39 Personal Benefits 31:28 Substantive Cases and War Termination 32:57 Leadership Change 36:36 Stopping Power Shifts 39:52 Information Convergence 42:29 Endgame Almost in F - Tranquillity by Kevin MacLeod is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Source: http://incompetech.com/music/royalty-free/index.html?isrc=USUAN1100394 Artist: http://incompetech.com/ Images licensed under CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/): From OSCE Special Monitoring Mission: https://www.flickr.com/photos/osce_smmu/albums/72157650787494428 https://www.flickr.com/photos/osce_smmu/albums/72157650784227730 From European People's Party: https://www.flickr.com/photos/45198836@N04/5555939209 Images licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/): From spoilt.exile: https://www.flickr.com/photos/spoilt_exile/12038421283 Images licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/): From Bundesarchiv: https://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/dba/de/search/?query=Bild+183-R92623 From Ввласенко: https://tinyurl.com/yaj9nuk2 From RIAN archive: http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#141088 http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#644461 Images licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/): From President.gov.ua: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/photos/zustrich-prezidenta-ukrayini-z-predstavnikami-kompaniyi-appl-4273 From mvs.gov.ua: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=328777909277865&set=pcb.328778209277835 From Government of Ukraine: https://www.zoda.gov.ua/news/4344/prezident-ukrajini-viktor-jushenko-privitav-hliborobiv-zaporizhzhya-z-pershim-zibranim-milyonom-tonn-zerna-urozhaju-2008-roku.html https://www.zoda.gov.ua/news/21782/vistup-prezidenta-ukrajini-na-plenarnomu-zasidanni-samitu-initsiativi-shidne-partnerstvo.html From armyinform.com.ua: https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/26/francziya-vymagatyme-vid-rf-znyaty-oblogu-mariupolya/ From Kremlin.ru: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20604 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/37381 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49382 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49437 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49615 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50329 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61177 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61467 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62277 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62388 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62553 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62626 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62983 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65079 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65869 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66191 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66254 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66414 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66675 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67061 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67438 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67846 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68016 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68097 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68191 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68287 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68366 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68386 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68500 From Rosavtodor.ru: http://rosavtodor.ru/press-center/media/photo/232301 http://rosavtodor.ru/about/upravlenie-fda/upravlenie-stroitelstva-i-ekspluatatsii-avtomobilnykh-dorog/transportnyy-perekhod-cherez-kerchenskiy-proliv/novosti/301381 From mil.ru: http://mil.ru/winner_may/history/more.htm?id=11925131@cmsArticle