US-China proximate military operations in the maritime, air, and space domains

Foreign

The discussion focuses on U.S-China military interactions in airspace and sea domains.

Introduction of Panelists

• Michael Hanlon introduces the panelists who are experts on U.S-China military interactions.

• The panelists will discuss close approaches between Chinese and American military assets in maritime, air, and space domains.

• The goal is to understand the implications, concerns, trend lines, and policy options related to these interactions.

Importance of the Subject

• Recent news reports highlight Chinese aircraft and ships interfering with American assets' movements.

• China is concerned about American proximity to their mainland and military operations.

• The United States opposes any restrictions on the use of international airspace and sea lanes.

• Both countries compete for influence in the region, raising security concerns.

Panelist Introductions

1. Robin Dickey - Works at the Aerospace Corporation's Center for Space Policy and Strategy. Has degrees from Johns Hopkins University.

2. Roderick Lee - Works at the Center for Naval Analyzes. Previously worked in the U.S Navy.

3. Josiah Case - Research analyst at CNA specializing in Chinese military operations and strategy.

Sea Domain

Josiah Case provides an overview of current U.S-China encounters at sea.

• Josiah Case introduces himself as a research analyst focusing on PRC perceptions of U.S military operations globally.

• He examines activities such as U.S Navy freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea and transits of the Taiwan Strait.

• Encounters between PLA (People's Liberation Army) and U.S forces are becoming more frequent but are characterized by unprofessional and unsafe behavior by PLA personnel.

Increase in Encounters at Sea

• The PLA Navy has made significant progress in becoming a Blue Water Navy, allowing for longer deployments away from home ports.

• More ships on the water increase the likelihood of encounters with foreign warships.

• Concern arises from the PLA's unprofessional and unsafe behavior during these encounters.

Timestamps are provided for each section to help locate specific parts of the video.

The Trend of Public Discussions on Encounters

This section discusses the increasing frequency of public discussions about encounters between China and other countries. It highlights China's investment in shaping international narratives and the battle for the narrative. The motive behind these discussions is explored, including defending their own actions or undermining the US.

Increasing Frequency of Public Discussions

• Encounters between China and other countries are being talked about more frequently in the public domain.

• Both sides are engaging in these discussions, indicating a battle for the narrative.

• China is actively shaping international narratives on issues related to its image and that of the US.

• The motive behind these discussions can be to defend their own actions or undermine the US.

Incidents in Historical Context

This section explores incidents throughout history that have sparked wars, emphasizing how governments talk about them. It highlights that incidents like border skirmishes or accidents between forces happen regularly worldwide. The importance of government communication during such incidents is emphasized.

Incidents as Catalysts for Crisis

• Throughout history, various types of incidents have sparked wars, such as border skirmishes or accidental clashes between forces.

• How governments communicate about these incidents plays a crucial role in determining whether they escalate into major crises.

• The current incidents at sea and in the air involving China are not isolated but part of a broader historical context.

• Government communication both with each other and their own people influences how incidents are perceived.

Current State of U.S.-China Defense Relationship

This section focuses on the current state of defense relations between the US and Chinese militaries. It highlights that there is a lack of effective communication between them, contributing to a rough state in their relationship.

Rough State of Defense Relationship

• The defense relationship between the US and Chinese militaries is currently in a rough state.

• Effective communication between the two sides is lacking, which adds to the challenges.

• The absence of proper communication channels impacts their ability to address issues and prevent misunderstandings.

Trend Lines and Qualitative Sketch

This section discusses the trend lines regarding frequency, danger, and unprofessionalism in encounters between China and other countries. It acknowledges that data on these incidents can be limited but highlights some historical examples for comparison.

Limited Data on Trend Lines

• Data on encounters between China and other countries can be limited, making it challenging to establish clear trend lines.

• Department of Defense (DOD) officials have publicly acknowledged an increase in such incidents.

• Comparing current incidents to past events like the EP3 incident or close approaches by Chinese destroyers provides some context.

• It is difficult to determine if there is a consistent upward trend in terms of danger or unprofessional behavior.

PLA's Professionalism and Operator Error

This section explores the professionalism of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the possibility of operator error in encounters. It emphasizes that while PLA is becoming more professional, operator errors still occur.

PLA's Professionalism and Operator Error

• The PLA is becoming a more professional military, which may contribute to improved conduct during encounters.

• However, operator errors are still possible despite overall professionalism.

• The discussion should focus on why these incidents occur rather than assuming a linear increase in danger or frequency.

Public Discussions vs. Problem Severity

This section addresses the skepticism surrounding increased public discussions about incidents without corresponding data. It highlights discrepancies in data availability and the US government's approach compared to Japan and Taiwan.

Skepticism Regarding Public Discussions

• Increased public discussions about incidents do not necessarily indicate a worsening problem.

• The lack of available data raises skepticism about the severity of the issue.

• Japanese and Taiwanese governments provide more data on Chinese activities, while the US government is more reserved in sharing information.

• Further exploration is needed to understand the reasons behind the US government's approach.

Trend Lines and Recent Encounters in Air Domains

This section focuses on trend lines and recent encounters in air domains. It highlights the historical sensitivity of air encounters for China and provides insights into past events.

Historical Context of Air Encounters

• Air encounters have been historically sensitive for China since the 1950s.

• Understanding trend lines requires considering historical events related to air encounters.

• More insights will be provided by Roderick regarding recent trends and specific incidents in air domains.

Chinese Perspective on U.S Surveillance

This section discusses the Chinese perspective on U.S surveillance and the historical context of their response.

Chinese Response to U.S Surveillance

• Claims in international waters by China date back to 1952, marking the beginning of over 70 years of constant U.S surveillance on their coastline.

• From the 1970s through the 1990s, there was a brief interruption in U.S surveillance operations off the Chinese coast due to improving relations between the two countries.

• The Chinese response to U.S surveillance should be viewed from a historical perspective starting from the 1950s, rather than just focusing on recent incidents like the EP3 incident.

• Over time, there has been a shift in how China responds to U.S sensitive reconnaissance operations. They have moved from shooting down aircraft to finesse their response and adjust it based on various factors.

• Taiwan also conducted reconnaissance flights over mainland China with support from the United States. These flights were seen as part of U.S enabled sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Increase in Unsafe Intercepts

This section discusses an increase in unsafe or unprofessional intercepts by China and possible reasons behind it.

Reasons for Increase in Unsafe Intercepts

• The Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledges an increase in unsafe or unprofessional intercepts by China.

• Tensions between the United States and China play a significant role in this increase.

• The Chinese argue that increased volume of U.S sensitive reconnaissance operations leads to more interceptions by them statistically.

• There has been an indication that China has improved its capabilities and proficiency in responding to such operations.

• Various incidents, such as close encounters and instances of damage caused by intercepted aircraft, contribute to the perception of increasing unprofessional behavior on the Chinese side.

• While individual pilots may interpret their directives differently, centrally directed non-war military activities guide China's response to sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Chinese Doctrine on Air Operations

This section discusses how China conducts air operations to assert airspace sovereignty and respond to sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Chinese Doctrine on Air Operations

• The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has issued new doctrine in June 2022 regarding non-war military activities, including air operations.

• To assert airspace sovereignty, China identifies the target and sends aircraft to intercept it.

• Once close enough to identify the aircraft's nationality and if it is engaged in sensitive reconnaissance operations, China attempts to push the aircraft out using various means, including close intercepts or non-lethal methods like deploying chaff.

• This approach aligns with how they talk about conducting air operations in their doctrine.

The transcript does not provide further sections or timestamps for additional topics.

Chinese Interception of US Flights

The speaker discusses the Chinese interception of US flights and suggests that the aggressiveness of the interceptions may be due to overinterpretation of guidance from higher headquarters. The speaker also mentions that the US conducts sensitive reconnaissance operations in the Asia Pacific region, which can easily be used to demonstrate displeasure towards China.

Chinese Instructions and Frequency of Interceptions

• The Chinese are instructed to interfere with US flights coming within 15 miles of the Chinese coastline, especially if they suspect surveillance activities.

• It is implied that these interceptions occur frequently, possibly on a daily basis.

• The instructions do not specify distance or airspace violation but rather focus on intensity levels based on perceived intelligence collection efforts.

Levels of Aggressiveness

• If the US flight is outside 12 nautical miles, the Chinese may try to push them out or position themselves between the aircraft and Chinese airspace.

• If the US flight is inside what China considers its airspace, including nine-line boundaries, they can be more assertive in their interception tactics.

• Unsafe or unprofessional intercepts occur regularly, but only a selection is shown publicly. Some intercepts are more aggressive than others.

Encounters in Outer Space

The speaker discusses encounters in outer space and highlights three factors that make them different from encounters in other domains: timing, territory, and technology. They explain how proximity is defined differently in space due to vast distances and high speeds.

Timing

• Objects travel at extremely fast speeds in space (e.g., International Space Station moves at about five miles per second).

• Close passes between objects can still be tens or hundreds of kilometers/miles apart but happen within seconds or less.

Territory

• Space around Earth is heavily used but not infinite.

• Different orbits have varying angles, resulting in objects crossing paths at different angles.

Technology

• Encounters in space involve advanced technology and require precise calculations to avoid collisions.

• Proximity is defined differently due to the vast distances involved.

The transcript provided does not include further sections or timestamps.

New Section

This section discusses the timing and predictability of encounters in space, the absence of territorial claims in outer space, the sensitivity of satellites to collisions and debris, and the challenges of communication and situational awareness.

Timing and Predictability

• Encounters in space can be predicted hours, days, or weeks in advance by tracking the trajectory of objects.

• Changes in an object's course may indicate a potential encounter.

• Early prediction can help de-escalate situations or reduce pressure to resolve issues.

Absence of Territorial Claims

• The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits states from claiming sovereignty over any part of space.

• There are no territorial waters or defense identification zones in space.

• Access to and use of space is open to all countries without specific location restrictions.

Sensitivity to Collisions and Debris

• Satellites and objects in space are sensitive to collisions due to their constant motion relative to each other.

• Even small debris traveling at high speeds can cause catastrophic effects.

• Orbital debris poses a significant risk and can damage satellites or stations.

Challenges with Communication and Situational Awareness

• Communication between satellite operators is challenging due to the vast distances involved.

• Direct radio communications are not feasible for satellite operators on opposite sides of the Earth.

• Situational awareness relies on advanced technology or trusted partners with such capabilities.

New Section

This section highlights the concentration of space situational awareness capabilities among a limited number of state actors. It also mentions the increasing number of companies and countries with some level of capability. The future trend indicates a rise in close approaches due to the growing number of satellites.

Concentration vs. Increasing Actors

• Historically, only a few state actors possessed advanced technology for space situational awareness.

• More countries and companies now have some level of space situational awareness capability.

• Access to advanced technology or trusted partners is crucial for effective situational awareness.

Unique Dynamics in Space

• Unlike other domains, there haven't been significant encounters between militaries in space.

• The increasing number of satellites and actors orbiting them is the most prominent trend in space.

• Close approaches and conjunctions may occur more frequently due to the growing satellite population.

New Section

This section discusses a specific event involving China and the United States as an example of potential challenges in space. It mentions a complaint made by China regarding close approaches by two Starlink satellites to their crewed space station. The episode highlights differences in perception and communication difficulties.

Example Event: China-U.S. Encounter

• In December 2021, China complained to the United Nations about close approaches by two Starlink satellites to their crewed space station.

• China claimed that the pass was close enough for their station to move out of the way, but SpaceX did not respond to communication attempts.

• The U.S. stated that their sensors did not predict a close enough pass requiring communication or avoidance maneuvers, and they never received any communication attempts from China.

New Section

This section addresses whether there is evidence of routine gamesmanship or manipulation of orbits between the two sides (China and the U.S.) in space. It mentions challenges with basic facts but does not provide data on such maneuvers.

Manipulation of Orbits

• There is no available data on routine gamesmanship or manipulation of orbits between China and the U.S.

• Basic facts about incidents can be disputed, making it challenging to determine if such maneuvers are occurring regularly.

• Some observations can be made using ground-based telescopes, but comprehensive data on these maneuvers is lacking.

New Section

This section discusses the 18th Space Control Squadron, a military unit responsible for safety notifications to satellite operators. There is a discussion about transitioning this responsibility from a military to a civil organization.

The Role of the 18th Space Control Squadron

• The 18th Space Control Squadron is a military unit that provides safety notifications to satellite operators involved in close approaches.

• There is ongoing discussion about potentially transitioning this responsibility from a military organization to a civil one.

New Section

This section highlights the challenges faced when trying to communicate with China regarding satellite safety. It raises concerns about deconflicting space activities and the lack of response from China in some cases.

Communication Challenges with China

• In congressional testimony, it has been mentioned that China often does not respond to communication attempts, even for friendly notifications.

• This lack of response raises concerns about deconflicting space activities between different countries.

• If easy cases cannot be resolved, it becomes challenging to address more complex situations.

New Section

This section focuses on assessing the severity of the problem and understanding why China may engage in encounter-like activities. It also addresses concerns about debris causing collisions and explosions in space.

Severity of the Problem and Chinese Activities

• The severity of the problem is assessed based on data trends and individual perspectives.

• Reasons behind China's potential engagement in encounter-like activities are explored.

• Concerns are raised regarding debris causing collisions and explosions in space.

New Section

This section provides an overview of historical anti-satellite testing by major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. It discusses the destructive nature of these tests and their impact on space debris.

Historical Anti-Satellite Testing

• Anti-satellite testing dates back to the 1950s, with early ideas involving nuclear-tipped weapons.

• The Soviet Union conducted coorbital anti-satellite tests in the 1970s, while the United States performed a direct descent test in 1985.

• In the 2000s, there were four satellite destruction events through anti-satellite activities by major powers.

• The most significant event occurred in 2007 when China conducted a direct descent anti-satellite missile test, resulting in a large amount of space debris.

New Section

This section continues discussing historical anti-satellite testing and addresses whether there have been further catastrophic incidents causing more debris or if major powers have adopted a moratorium on such activities.

Catastrophic Incidents and Moratorium

• The Chinese direct descent anti-satellite missile test in 2007 produced over 3,000 long-lived pieces of debris, making it the most polluting event in human history.

• There have been no further catastrophic incidents causing significant debris since then.

• Major powers like the United States, China, and Russia may have adopted a self-interest-driven moratorium to preserve space for commercial and military purposes.

International Space Station Sheltering in Place

This section discusses the International Space Station (ISS) having to shelter in place due to the risk of debris. It also mentions the major push by the U.S and other countries to address the issue of destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests.

ISS Sheltering in Place and Debris Risk

• The ISS had to shelter in place due to the risk of debris.

• This resulted in over 1500 trackable pieces of debris being produced.

• The U.S led a major push, joined by other countries, to address this issue.

Commitments and Resolutions

• In April of last year, the U.S announced a commitment to not conduct destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missile tests.

• About 13 countries have made similar unilateral commitments.

• A United Nations resolution was passed with about 150 countries voting in favor, except for China and Russia who voted against it.

Criticism from China and Russia

• China and Russia criticized the proposal, viewing it as an attempt by the U.S to limit others' behavior.

• They argue that since they have already conducted such tests, they believe the U.S is trying to prevent them from catching up.

• China has refrained from conducting direct descent destructive tests since 2007 due to diplomatic consequences.

Concerns about China's Actions in Space

This section focuses on concerns about China's actions in space and explores their motives. It also discusses what would be needed for China to feel reassured or change its behavior.

Worries about China's Actions

• There is an uptick in unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the PLA (People's Liberation Army).

• Beijing is trying to communicate messages not only to the U.S but also to its neighbors and domestic audience.

• China's actions, such as intercepting aircraft or conducting military operations, are meant to demonstrate their commitment to national sovereignty.

Historical Context and National Humiliation

• China's actions can be understood in the context of its history of national humiliation.

• The Opium Wars and other historical events shape the narrative taught to Chinese children about exploitation and oppression by external forces.

• Intercepting aircraft or driving away warships reinforces the message that the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) protects China's sovereignty.

Addressing China's Concerns

• To address China's concerns, it would require understanding their need for reassurance and confidence.

• Rolling back military operations or reducing public discussions about them could be seen as a goodwill gesture to avoid conflict or accidents.

Signaling Messages through Actions

This section highlights how China uses its actions in space to send messages both domestically and internationally. It emphasizes the importance of these messages in shaping public opinion and reinforcing CCP's authority.

Signaling Messages

• China uses intercepts of aircraft or military operations as opportunities to send messages.

• Chinese media portrays these actions as defending national territory, reinforcing CCP's commitment to protecting sovereignty.

• These messages are not only directed at foreign countries but also resonate with Chinese citizens who see them as proof of CCP's capability and legitimacy.

Historical Narrative

• The historical narrative taught in Chinese classrooms includes stories of exploitation and oppression by external forces.

• Intercepting aircraft or driving away warships serves as reminders that the CCP ended this era of humiliation.

• Even those who may not support the CCP still receive the message that it is necessary for maintaining stability and providing for the people.

U.S Actions and Reassurance

• When considering what the U.S can do, rolling back military operations or reducing discussions about them could be seen as a goodwill gesture.

• This could signal to China that the U.S is concerned about the current situation and wants to avoid conflict or accidents.

The transcript provided does not contain any further timestamps.

New Section

In this section, the speaker discusses the potential message that would be sent to Manila and Hanoi if the US were to violate international law. The speaker also highlights the changing winds in terms of US presence in the South China Sea and the implications it may have on perceptions of Beijing as the future.

Potential Message to Manila and Hanoi

• If the US were to violate international law, it may send a message to Manila and Hanoi that the US is no longer reliable in terms of its commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

• This could lead to a perception that Beijing is becoming more influential while Washington is losing its influence.

• It is important to consider how such a message would impact cooperation on various issues, including climate change, Taiwan, and military presence in South Korea and Japan.

New Section

In this section, the speaker discusses the potential consequences of pulling back operations or reducing reconnaissance activities as an attempt to show goodwill towards Beijing. The speaker emphasizes that such actions may be perceived as weakness by China and could affect cooperation on various fronts.

Consequences of Pulling Back Operations

• If the US were to pull back operations or reduce reconnaissance activities as a gesture of goodwill towards China, Beijing may interpret it as a sign of weakness.

• This perception of weakness could extend beyond just cooperation on specific issues like climate change or Taiwan but also impact other areas such as military presence in South Korea and Japan.

• China might view this as their hard-line stance against the US working effectively and making them back down.

New Section

In this section, one speaker asks another if they believe China genuinely wants to improve hotlines, communications, reduce tension, and danger. The questioner suggests that tensions and anxiety may be deliberate instruments used by China to achieve certain behavioral changes from the US.

China's Intentions in Improving Communication

• The questioner raises doubts about whether China genuinely wants to improve hotlines, communications, and reduce tension.

• They suggest that tensions, anxiety, and danger may be deliberate instruments used by China to influence US behavior and potentially achieve a degree of pullback.

• The questioner implies that China believes it can control the level of danger like a rheostat and use it strategically to produce desired changes in US behavior.

New Section

In this section, one speaker shares their perspective on the increase in encounters between the US and China in the air domain. They discuss how both sides have become more proficient over time and how the PLA (People's Liberation Army) has improved its capabilities.

Increase in Air Encounters

• The speaker is not particularly concerned about the increase in encounters between the US and China in the air domain.

• While there may be an increase in unsafe or unprofessional encounters, they believe it is partly due to increased proficiency on both sides.

• The speaker cites an incident from 2001 as an example of pilot error but highlights that the PLA has since improved its training and operations significantly.

• They mention that current PLA pilots receive around 140 flight hours on average compared to approximately 120 for US pilots.

• The speaker suggests that these improvements in aircraft performance and pilot proficiency allow China to better manage encounters with the US.

New Section

In this section, one speaker discusses their belief that major incidents between the US and China are less likely due to improved crisis management capabilities of the PLA. They also highlight a potential difference in perspectives regarding intercepts as a byproduct of US policy.

Decreased Likelihood of Major Incidents

• The speaker believes that the likelihood of major incidents between the US and China has decreased due to improved crisis management capabilities of the PLA.

• They suggest that even if an incident occurs, there is a greater ability to manage and de-escalate the situation through communication with the United States.

• The speaker also mentions that intercepts are a byproduct of US policy and may continue unless there is a fundamental change in US policy regarding its presence in the Asia Pacific region.

This summary covers only a portion of the transcript.

U.S-China Relationship and Communication

This section discusses the U.S-China relationship, communication challenges, and the potential for a serious crisis or conflict.

U.S-China Relationship and Communication

• The speaker believes that as long as both parties feel comfortable and in control of the situation, there is no foreseeable change in their willingness to escalate tensions.

• Increased risk to use force may be necessary to accomplish missions, but it is not seen as an inherent issue in the U.S-China relationship.

• Close encounters between aircraft or ships are not expected to result in a total collapse of communication or lead to a serious crisis or conflict.

• Both sides are confident in their ability to transmit messages through non-verbal means and do not see the need for improved formal communications.

• The Chinese believe that the U.S communicates deliberately through non-verbal cues, while verbal communication holds less value.

• There is concern about misunderstandings and misinterpretations leading to unintended escalation, such as the Chinese believing that the U.S is preparing for war.

Space Activities and Potential Risks

This section focuses on space activities, their strategic importance, and potential risks associated with close encounters.

Space Activities and Potential Risks

• With increasing activities in space, it becomes strategically important but also poses potential risks.

• Satellites play a crucial role in maintaining nuclear stability between countries by preventing surprise with nuclear activities.

• Diplomacy and communication are essential when dealing with satellites as any interference can be interpreted as a start of nuclear escalation.

• While there haven't been signs of top-level escalation yet, there is still a possibility due to various uses of satellites.

• Unlike maritime and air domains, there are limited rules for encounters in space. Treaties provide broad principles but lack clear definitions and guidelines.

The transcript is already in English, so no language conversion is required.

New Section

This section discusses the different perspectives of the United States, China, and Russia on space security and the efforts to define responsible behavior in space.

Perspectives on Space Security

• The United Nations has an open-ended working group on preventing threats in space through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior.

• The US, UK, and their partners focus on defining responsible behaviors in space due to the difficulty of knowing the exact capabilities of satellites.

• China and Russia are focused on the concept of space weapons and have proposed a draft treaty called the Prevention of Placement of Weapons or Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space (PPWT).

• The PPWT does not include direct descent anti-satellite missiles as they are deployed on the ground.

• The US criticizes these points but until the Norms effort gained traction, China and Russia claimed that there was no alternative proposal from the US.

New Section

This section explores the different lenses through which China, Russia, and the US view future space security measures.

Different Lenses for Future Space Security

• China and Russia propose a treaty to prevent deployment of systems/weapons in outer space.

• The US opposes this proposal due to concerns about verifiability and because some within its defense community consider potential military options involving weapons in space.

• The US emphasizes that any new treaties need to be equitable, effectively verifiable, and in its interest.

• Dual-use technologies like satellites capable of grappling with other objects pose challenges as they can be used for beneficial purposes like debris removal but also potentially for hostile actions against active satellites.

New Section

This section discusses why the US opposes the Russian and Chinese proposal for a treaty on preventing deployment of systems/weapons in outer space.

Reasons for US Opposition

• The US has long-standing communications on negotiating new treaties, emphasizing the need for equity, effective verifiability, and alignment with its interests.

• Verifiability is a major point of contention regarding the proposed treaty.

• The policy challenge lies in defining what constitutes a space weapon, including dual-use technologies like satellites capable of grappling with other objects.

• The ODNI worldwide threat assessment mentions China's exploration and development of such dual-use technologies.

New Section

This section highlights the challenges in creating a treaty that prohibits weapons in space due to the difficulty of defining space weapons and addressing dual-use technologies.

Challenges in Prohibiting Weapons in Space

• Defining what constitutes a space weapon is complex, especially when considering dual-use technologies.

• Dual-use technologies like satellites capable of grappling with other objects can be used for beneficial purposes but also have potential military applications.

• Creating a treaty that effectively addresses these challenges is difficult.

Discussion on the Capability and Potential Harm of Maneuverable Satellites

The discussion revolves around the possibility of deploying maneuverable satellites and the potential harm they can cause to other satellites. It is acknowledged that any satellite capable of maneuvering has the potential to cause harm in a collision, which can be highly destructive.

Possible Norms for Deploying Capable Satellites

• There is a discussion about whether it would be better to have a norm that allows for the deployment of capable satellites, rather than restricting their deployment altogether.

• It is recognized that any satellite with maneuvering capabilities has the potential to cause harm to other satellites.

Taking Multiple Questions and Cherry Picking Responses

The panelist plans to take multiple questions at once and give each panelist an opportunity to choose one or two questions to respond to due to time constraints.

Efficient Question Handling Technique

• The panelist mentions using a technique learned from Fiona Hill, where multiple questions are taken at once, allowing each panelist to select one or two questions they want to respond to.

• This approach helps condense the discussion within the limited time available.

Audience Questions on Freedom of Navigation Operations and Compliance with China's Declarations

Several audience members ask questions related to freedom of navigation operations, innocent passage, compliance with China's declared ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone), and China's nuclear activity in East Turkistan (Xinjiang).

Distinction between Freedom of Navigation and Innocent Passage

• A question is raised regarding the distinction being made in conducting freedom of navigation operations between freedom of navigation and innocent passage.

• Specifically, it is asked if innocent passage is ever claimed by the U.S Navy, indicating recognition of territorial waters around South China Sea features.

Compliance with China's ADIZ in the East China Sea

• Another question pertains to the variation in compliance with China's declared ADIZ in the East China Sea among U.S allies.

• It is asked if some allies follow China's request for advanced notification, while others do not.

Lack of U.S Government Response to China's Nuclear Activity

• A question is raised about why the U.S government is not actively calling out China's nuclear activity in East Turkistan (Xinjiang).

• Given China's history of testing nuclear weapons and rush to achieve nuclear breakout, it is questioned why there is no active response to activities like mock US aircraft carriers and nuclear missile silos being built in certain areas.

Different Narratives and Encounters as Coast Guard vs. Naval Assets

The discussion focuses on whether there are different narratives or changes when operating as a U.S Coast Guard asset compared to a naval asset during fun Ops missions. Additionally, the question arises if there are differences in narratives domestically in China regarding encounters in other parts of the world.

Narrative Differences between Coast Guard and Naval Assets

• The panelist is asked if there are narrative differences or changes when operating as a U.S Coast Guard asset compared to a naval asset during fun Ops missions.

• Specifically, it is questioned if there are any differences in how encounters are perceived or handled based on the type of asset involved.

Domestic Narratives in China for Encounters

• Another question relates to whether there are different narratives domestically within China regarding encounters that occur outside their immediate region.

• Examples such as encounters around the Galapagos or other parts of the world are mentioned.

Questions on Interpretation of Permissiveness and Mobility Exercise

Audience members ask questions about how China might interpret permissiveness based on the lack of direct response by the U.S to the Russian Downing of a U.S drone. Additionally, there is a question about the recent Mobility Guardian exercise conducted by the Air Force in the Pacific.

China's Interpretation of Permissiveness

• A question is raised regarding how China might interpret the permissiveness of anti-US drug interdiction based on the lack of direct response by the U.S to the Russian Downing of a U.S drone.

• The audience member seeks insights into how China may perceive and respond to such situations.

Air Force Mobility Guardian Exercise

• Another question pertains to the recently concluded Mobility Guardian exercise conducted by the Air Force in the Pacific.

• The panelist is asked if there are any initial reactions or observations from both air science and space perspectives, and whether it conforms with norms of approximate operations or signals something different.

Projection of Chinese Power in Aerospace and Sea Space

The discussion focuses on how China projects its power in terms of shipping, air, aerospace, and sea space. It explores potential implications and comparisons with previous interactions with Russia in airspace.

Projection of Chinese Power

• The panelists are asked about their observations regarding China's projection of power in terms of shipping, air, aerospace, and sea space.

• Insights are sought into what this projection might look like and any potential implications.

Panelist Responses: Freedom of Navigation Operations and Innocent Passage

Panelists provide responses to questions related to freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) and innocent passage.

Distinction between Freedom of Navigation and Innocent Passage

• One panelist addresses the distinction between freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) and innocent passage.

• It is explained that FONOPS challenge excessive maritime claims by conducting drills within 12 nautical miles to communicate non-recognition as territorial seas.

• Innocent passage through China's claimed straight baselines may challenge their excessive maritime claim that requires pre-entry notification and permission.

Panelist Response: Capability of Maneuverable Satellites

A panelist responds to a question regarding the capability and potential harm of maneuverable satellites.

Capability and Potential Harm of Maneuverable Satellites

• The panelist acknowledges the potential harm that can be caused by any satellite capable of maneuvering in a collision.

• Examples are given, such as conducting drills near Mischief Reef to communicate non-recognition of territorial sea claims.

• It is emphasized that there are distinctions between freedom of navigation operations and innocent passage, depending on the specific circumstances.

Narrative versus Fallops in the South China Sea

The US is committed to freedom of navigation and upholding the rules-based system across the world. They conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) not only in the South China Sea but also against their allies. These actions are not meant to target or single out China.

• The US emphasizes that FONOPs are part of their commitment to uphold the rules-based system.

• FONOPs are conducted against both China and other allies, such as Costa Rica.

• The US does not portray China as a bad actor but rather focuses on maintaining freedom of navigation globally.

Different Responses to Coast Guard and Navy Operations

While there may not be major deviations in messaging across partners and allies, there are differences in how Coast Guard operations are discussed compared to Navy operations. Response strategies also vary depending on the situation.

• Civilian aircraft comply with freedom of navigation principles, but it's unclear if there are major deviations among partners and allies.

• Coast Guard operations, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait, are talked about differently than typical Navy transits.

• Responses to different types of operations, including air transits and P8 surveillance flights, may also vary.

• Incidents outside China's immediate periphery may receive less attention in Chinese media.

Concerns about Chinese Nuclear Breakout

The US expresses concerns about any nuclear testing by China due to its destabilizing nature. If China were to resume nuclear testing, it would be a cause for alarm for the US.

• The US raises concerns about Chinese nuclear breakout because it represents a significant increase in nuclear capabilities.

• Resuming nuclear testing would be seen as a destabilizing action, and the US would strongly oppose it.

• The US would consider any nuclear testing by China as a sign that something serious is about to happen.

Professional Interactions with Chinese Military

The US aims for professional interactions with the Chinese military when they are in proximity or within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, there may be limitations and potential challenges in certain scenarios.

• The US strives for professionalism during encounters with the Chinese military near areas like the Aleutian Islands and Hawaii.

• If Chinese bombers were to conduct patrols near the Aleutians, it would require careful coordination due to logistical constraints.

• While the US expects professional behavior from China, assertiveness may vary depending on proximity to their own periphery.

Unintentional Activities and Miscommunication

There may be instances where activities conducted by China are not explicitly authorized or clearly understood by higher leadership. This can lead to misunderstandings and potential issues.

• Some activities carried out by China may not have been explicitly authorized or fully understood by higher leadership.

• Miscommunication or lack of clarity regarding airspace boundaries could result in unintended incidents.

• These incidents are expected to be rare, but there might be occasional misunderstandings between China and the US.

Unclear Question about UA Counter UAVs

The question asked is unclear from the transcript. It is difficult to provide a summary without further context or clarification.

Chinese Counter UAV Techniques

In this section, the speaker discusses the possibility of Chinese counter UAV techniques and their potential use of jammers to interfere with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Chinese Approach to Counter UAV

• The Chinese are likely to have better ways of countering UAVs.

• They may use counter UAV jammers to disrupt or disable aircraft.

• Running an aircraft into a UAV is generally not a good idea, so temporary jamming or interference with electro-optical sensors is more probable.

Deliberate Interference with Electro Optical Sensors

The speaker continues discussing the Chinese approach to countering UAVs, specifically focusing on deliberate interference with electro-optical sensors.

Deliberate Interference Tactics

• It is unlikely that the Chinese would deliberately run an aircraft into a UAV.

• However, they may engage in tactics such as interference or dazzling of electro-optical sensors on a UAV.

Concluding Remarks and Appreciation

The speakers conclude their conversation and express gratitude for each other's contributions.

Final Thoughts and Appreciation

• Teaming up for this discussion has been great.

• The last word goes to the other speaker.

• Expressing gratitude for conceptualizing the conversation and being a driving force behind it.

Lessons from Other Domains in Geopolitics

The speaker reflects on the initial idea behind comparing encounters in space with other domains and emphasizes the importance of learning lessons from different geopolitical contexts.

Learning from Other Domains

• Originally, the idea was to explore potentials for encounters in space.

• A comparative approach helps understand the differences and similarities across domains.

• Space is not separate from national security conversations, and there are valuable lessons to be learned from other domains.

Continuity in Geopolitics

The speaker highlights the continuity in geopolitics and emphasizes that space is not a separate realm but an integral part of national security discussions.

Geopolitical Continuity

• While space has its unique aspects, it is still connected to geopolitical concerns.

• Lessons from other domains can inform our understanding of space-related issues.

• Space should not be seen as a completely distinct entity; it is part of the broader national security conversation.